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Abstract
The paper stresses that in order to understand the current re-organizational processes in the
food system, two kinds of social capital should be taken into account, trust and network-based
social capital. Stemming from a case study, concerning the Italian processing tomato industry,
it demonstrates that while trust seems to enhance social welfare, by reducing transaction costs
and promoting cooperative behavior, network-based social capital mainly affects firm
competitive behavior, with unpredictable effects on social welfare.
Keywords: social capital, trust, networks
Introduction
Social capital is generally deemed to be associated with better economic performance, whether
at aggregate level, i.e. with respect to the whole economy of a country, or at a more micro
level, i.e. with respect to competitive advantages that firms can attain because of their access to
social capital. The most common measures of social capital have been trust and associability.
In the paper we stress that these measures alone, while being effective for macro analysis of
social capital, are ineffective and somehow misleading when assessing the role of social capital
in business performance. In the first section, we give some definitions of social capital and
show how they fit important organizational issues in the food system. In the second section, we
discuss the role of social capital in the Italian processing tomato industry, explaining how
different kinds of social capital account for different strategic patterns followed by the two
agro-industrial districts in this industry. Concluding remarks contain suggestions for future
theoretical and empirical research.
1.   Social capital and the food system
The concept of social capital dates back to the early twentieth century and was first used by
authors interested in the analysis and assessment of modern western democracies (Putnam,
Goss, 2002, pp.3-7). Stemming from the seminal work of Coleman (Coleman, 1988), during
the nineties the concept has spread throughout the social sciences, from sociology to
economics, anthropology and politics.
While a survey of different concepts and definitions of social capital is beyond the scope of
this paper, a clarification must be made in order to distinguish at least between two different
strands of literature, that allow for very different ‘discourses’ on the role of social capital in the198   Social Capital and the Food System: Some Evidences from Empirical Research
food system. The first strand of literature is related to the works of Putnam (1993) and
Fukuyama (1995) regarding the role of social capital in improving democracy and economic
development. These authors basically view social capital as a kind of impersonal and
generalized trust that reinforces social relationships, building up, along with other kinds of
social norms, those social networks constituting the structure of civil society (or as in a mirror
image social capital is described as social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity).
According to this view, social capital fosters democracy and economic development by
facilitating social and economic exchanges (reducing monitoring and sanctioning cost) and
allowing dilemmas of collective action to be resolved (limiting free-riding and offering
cooperative-based solutions to collective action problems). According to this definition, social
capital is measured mainly through the dimensions of associability, trust and attention (Offe,
Fuchs, 2002). Indirectly related to this strand of literature on social capital are economic
theories (Bowles, 2004; Fher, Gachter, 2000; Fher Schmidt, 2001) that stress the role of
reciprocal behaviors, social preferences and social norms in solving organizational problems
associated with contract incompleteness and in explaining experimental results of bargaining
games.
The second strand of literature is related to works by Burt and Lin (Burt, 92, 97; Lin, 99, 01)
on social structure. Here social capital is defined as “resources embedded in a social structure
that are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions” (Lin, 2001, p.29), where the social
structure refers to relationships (that are the frame of a network) among social actors.
Accordingly, networks are themselves considered a form of social capital. Linkages with other
actors constitute the network of an actor, i.e. her social capital, whose value depends on (Burt,
1992, p.12) 1-the structure of the networks, 2- the resources contacts hold (whom the actor
reaches), and 3- the nature of relationships (how the actor reaches). Following this definition,
social capital is not necessarily associated with cooperative behavior and high level of trust,
but rather it nourishes competitive behavior based on the exploitation of information and
control opportunities offered to an actor by her endowment of social capital. Related to this
strand of literature is the theory of social exchange, and mainly the power-dependence theory
both in its strictly-structural (Cook, Emerson, 1978) and structural-strategic (Molm, 1997)
version. 
Associated with these two general perspectives on social capital are different analytical tools
and research styles. The trust-perspective leans on descriptive and historical analysis and has
mainly been followed by scholars in politics and functional sociology. Network-perspective
makes use of analytical tools from social network analysis and theories of communication
networks and has been followed by structural sociologists and scholars in business and
management.
Figure 1 summarizes definitions and related bibliographic references of the two social capital
perspectives (Coleman, 1990). Note that between the trust and the network perspective lies
Coleman’s conceptualization that captures both the functional and the structural aspect of
social capital, resulting in a very general but also rigorous definition.Valeria Sodano and Fabio Verneau   199
Over the last fifteen years, economic theories have borrowed the concept of social capital from
sociology and politics, mainly through the bridges built by economic sociology. Institutional
theories have looked at the trust perspective when studying trust and social norms as exchange
organizational forms alternative to markets, contracts and hierarchies. Management and
industrial organization theories have looked whether at trust, as a lubricant of inter and intra
firm relationships, or at network perspective, considering social capital as a source of
competitive advantage. 
With respect to the food system, the concept of social capital has been mainly used in order to
explain at least three strategic and organizational features of the system:
1. The “maintenance” of regional products, as niche markets surviving in the
monopolistically competitive fringes of the huge oligopolies leading the system. In that case
social capital is involved in the process of construction and enforcement of quality standards
used in the definition of origin denomination, and in the process of quality perception (this
latter being associated, for these products, with cultural-based credence quality attributes).
2. The success and consolidation of local agro-industrial district. Industrial districts are a
special type of inter-organizational form characterized by the presence of a small-firm
network with specific territorial boundaries In industrial districts social norms are as
important as formal institutions in coordinating actors’ behaviour The literature on industrial
districts (Pyke and Sengerberger, 1992; Brusco, 1996; Sodano, 2004) has generally
maintained that at the core of the organizational specificity of a district there is the
exploitation of some form of social capital embedded in social relations. 
 
TRUST (Social norms) 
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3. The emergence in the system of collaborative inter-firm relationships, such as strategic
alliances, consortiums and joint ventures (Sporleder, 1994, 2000). These kinds of
relationships occur when firms engage in formal or informal agreements to strategically
exploit a common advantage associated with the “external synergies” stemming from the
relations themselves. For instance, collaborative relationships between retailers and
suppliers in the supremacy of the marketing channel (may) create gain opportunity by
maximizing consumer satisfaction and minimizing costs
It is worth noticing that in all three cases mentioned social capital is 1- mainly retained in the
form suggested by the trust perspective, and 2- is generally deemed to cause welfare
enhancement, by fostering organizational efficiency and innovation. On the contrary, few
efforts have been made so far in investigating social capital from a network perspective,
considering also possible negative welfare effects of social capital exploitation practices. This
lack of attention for the “downside” of social capital could lead (as we try to explain below) to
somewhat misleading interpretations of the re-organizational processes currently occurring in
the food system. 
While in the 1960s and 1970s the key players in the world economy were largely vertically
integrated, in the 1980s and 1990s “the rising integration of world markets through trade
brought with it a disintegration of the production process of multinational firms, since
companies found it profitable to outsource (domestically and abroad) an increasing share of
their noncore manufacturing and service activities” (Gereffi, 2005, p. 166). As a consequence,
the whole production structure in the global economy changed, with the emergence of
international trade and production networks. During the last two decades in the food sector
many TNCs have progressively reduced their involvement in first-tier processing and have
engaged in policies of outsourcing together with high investments in brand equity. 
Literature on industrial organization indicates as causes of vertical disintegration, efficiency
seeking and market power enhancing behavior. Networks and vertical integration have been
compared as alternative supply structures for specialized inputs, with networks turning
dedicated into flexible assets (Kranton and Minnehart, 2000). The general wisdom is that
flexible assets and networks involve social benefits when there is high demand uncertainty. In
the case of the food sector, where inputs generally exhibit a low level of specialization, major
causes of disintegration seem to be the possibility of boosting profit through the exercise of
high buying power (stemming from the weakness of fragmented suppliers with few exchange
alternatives), and the cost saving due to poor labor and environmental regulations (these latter
generally occur in developing countries where suppliers are situated). According to this view,
firms engaged in outsourcing build their own networks structured in such a way as to
maximize the value of their social capital. Networks rich in structural holes and in relations
with suppliers characterized by imbalances in bargaining power (such imbalances are
associated with asymmetries in exchange opportunities between the counter parties, as
predicted by the power-dependence theory) provide these firms with competitive advantages
and profit opportunities. Negative welfare effects may derive from an exacerbation of market
imperfection at final as well as intermediate markets of the food supply chain, and from
inequalities in income distribution among actors in the chain. It is worth noticing that in the
framework sketched not only is trust inessential for the accessibility to (this network style)
social capital benefit, but it may even be destroyed as a consequence of it. Trust waste canValeria Sodano and Fabio Verneau   201
occur either because of the impoverishment and fragmentation of weaker parties in the
networks (with less physical and psychological resources left to invest in common activities
and associability) or because of deregulation in labor security and environment protection
fostered by leading actors (with a generalized loss of confidence in all form of institutions able
to supply public goods). 
2.    Social capital and the processed tomato industry
2.1. Current structure and strategies
Italy accounts for about 35% of the whole world supply of processed tomato. The industry
exhibits a district-type form of organization, with two districts localized in narrow territories
around a central and a southern region, namely Emilia and Campania. These two regions are
often mentioned in the literature on social capital, as an example of territories following
different development patterns due to just that very different endowment of social capital. In
his seminal work on social capital Putnam (1993) argues that the higher economic performance
of Emilia, with respect to Campania, during the eighties and the nineties, was due to the greater
effectiveness of regional government (introduced in the 1970s), this latter associated with the
higher stock of social capital as measured by Putnam’s civic community index. Mackie (2001)
notices that already Macchiavelli held Emilia up as an example of a high trust society (and
hence a perfect candidate for a republican government), in contrast to the case of Campania, a
typical example of low-trust society that could be ruled only by a prince. Campania’s lack of
social capital has also been denounced in wider literature on institutional motivations
underlying the chronic underdevelopment of Southern Italy (Mutti, 1998).
As a result of these very different socio-cultural environments, the two processed tomato agro-
industrial districts look very different. Considering the three “integrating” factors generally
suggested by the literature on industrial districts, -1) economies of scope and localization, 2)
network externalities, and 3) local social capital (in terms of trust and associability)
endowment-, it can be said that the first factor accounts for the organizational strength of the
southern district, while factors 2) and 3) mainly pertain to the northern district.
Such differences are evident looking at the different structural and strategic traits of the
industry in the two regions, as summarised in tab. 1.202   Social Capital and the Food System: Some Evidences from Empirical Research
Table 1. Different structural and strategic traits of the industry in the two districts
In the 1980s and 1990s the Italian processing tomato industry performed very successfully,
mainly because of the demand increase and the EU subsidy regime. This latter particularly
boosted the Campania district due to growers’ and processors’ fraudulent overstatement of
tomato purchases, the so-called ‘paper’ or ‘ghost’ tomato. At least 15 per cent of southern
tomato factories seem to have been involved in such fraud. At the dawn of the new millennium
Distinctive district traits Emilia Campania
Main product paste Peel canned tomato whole peeled
Own brand Seldom used Often used
Grower
Many of small dimension; high
cohesion through cooperative and
strong collaborative relationships.
Many of small dimension; low cohesion;
weak collaborative relationships.
Processors Few  of  medium  dimension Few of large dimension and many of
small dimension
Vertical relationships Collaborative Competitive
Main  customers Big buyers and large retailers
(private label)
Own brand processors, large retailers







Weakness Slow modernization process;
Cost disadvantages





Strength  Strong relationships with big 
buyers;
High quality (certification, 
traceability, organic pest control)
Trading skill 
Knowledge of the market 
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the scenario has changed in a way such as to risk the Italian world leadership and the very
survival of part of the industry. The growth rate of demand has declined, the EU subsidies have
been reduced, and world supply has been progressively affected by the growing Chinese
production. Moreover the more and more aggressive brand policies carried out by large
retailers are resulting in a new competitive fight between private labels and manufacturer
brands. US industry adapted in two ways to the new market conditions, with some firms
specializing in scale production (as in the case of Morning Star which has heavily invested in
plant capacity and modernization, in order to achieve higher efficiency and cost advantages)
and others specializing in brand equity (as in the case of Heinz, Sara Lee, and Kraft, which
have engaged in strategies of vertical disintegration and outsourcing, along with high
investment in brand equity, with expertise in brand management rather than production
becoming their core source of competitive advantage). 
With regard to Italian firms, three strategies are currently viable for coping with the changing
competitive scenario: 1) building new relationships  with retail organizations, seeking
collaborative agreements and softer competition with private labels; 2) innovation at the
maturity stage of the life cycle, striving to succeed in differentiation strategies and niche
markets; 3) re-positioning own business in the global market, trying to find new places in
emerging networks resulting from outsourcing and market globalization. A fourth strategy – 
– 4) aiming at leading positions in the global market, giving priority either to cost minimizing
or brand equity maximizing strategy- seems, on the other hand, not to be viable because of the
lack of large corporations (especially after the breakdown of Cirio and Parmalat) and because
of the relative high cost due to fragmentation both at agricultural and manufacturer level.
2.2 Assessing the role of social capital
In this section, we illustrate the lack of trust in the southern district, suggesting that differences
in trust-based social capital account for different strategies in the two districts. We use results
from the initial stage of a research we are currently carrying out on the socially-based
determinants of strategies in the industry.
In order to evaluate the statistical situation in the two Italian regions concerned with processed
tomatoes, both some official statistics (see tables 5 and 6) and some data gathered during an
ongoing survey examining the structure and strategy of tomato processing companies (see
tables 2, 3 and 4) have been taken into consideration. The survey in question involved
distributing a questionnaire to 29 firms, of which 23 operate in Campania, and the other 6 in
Emilia.
Table 2. Human capital and level of openness towards the outside
Source. Our own work
Campania Emilia
Managerial staff with a degree 20% 56%
Reports concerning research 58% 100%
Business trips abroad 5 10
Training and refresher courses 1.4 2.5204   Social Capital and the Food System: Some Evidences from Empirical Research
Table 3. Percentage of those registered in formal and informal associations
Source: our own work
Table 4.Voluntary organisations in Italy
 Source: ISTAT
Table 5. High trust in institutions (percentage values)
Source: our own work
Table 6. Rate of criminal and illicit activity 
Source: ISTAT
Altogether the firms interviewed process about 4.6 tons of fresh tomato, representing about
58% of the total amount of tomato processed in Italy. The sample, therefore, despite not being
representative or chosen at random, covers a significant part of national production.
The statistical indicators emerging from the field survey are the ones traditionally taken into
account by related literature, namely, human capital, associability, trust and criminality
(Grootaeri et al., 2004).
The section on human capital has been able to show both the higher level of openness towards
the outside and higher quality management structure of the Emilia region. All the companies
(see tab. 2), in fact, declare relations with public bodies and associations with the aims of
research and counselling, against 58% in the Campania region. As regards business trips
abroad, on average the employees of firms in Emilia make about 10 annually, against 5 by
Type of association Campania Emilia
Trade unions or professional bodies 45 50
Voluntary organisations 10 50
Cultural and recreational organisations 20 35
Humanitarian and religious organisations 10 5
Environmental organisations 0 50
Campania Emilia Italy





Law enforcement 48 88
Public health 17 75
Education 22 67
Justice 39 38
Local government 17 88
Central Government 30 67
Campania Emilia Italia
Murders and attempted murders /100.000 
inhabitants
9.8 3.6 5.1
Robberies/100.000 inhabitants 205.7 59.3 80.3
Total/100.000 inhabitants 6192 4153 4937Valeria Sodano and Fabio Verneau   205
employees in Campania. The management structure comprises mostly graduates in the 25 to
40 age range in firms in Emilia, whilst in Campania only 20% are graduates and the average
age is mostly over 40.
The level of participation in formal and informal associations enables us to notice further
differences. As shown in table 3, relative to the survey carried out with questionnaires, the
interviewees from Campania show a preference for trade unions and professional bodies whilst
participation in voluntary, environmental or recreational organisations is all but non-existent.
In Emilia, on the other hand, the percentage of interviewees belonging to such organisations is
much higher, with the single exception of religious based ones.
The analysis of the principal data relative to the two Regions also shows major differences. In
tab. 4 we show data published by two ISTAT surveys relative to the importance of voluntary
organisations and criminal activity carried out in Italy and in the two Regions being examined.
The consistency of voluntary activity in Campania is well under the national average, and
occupies, with only 0.3 organisations per 10,000 inhabitants, the last place amongst the Italian
regions whilst Emilia, placed at sixth in the list, comes out as one of the Italian regions with the
highest density of organisations and number of volunteers.
Regarding trust indicators, in both groups about 50% of interviewees trust both their
neighbours and most of the people they know, so showing a substantial similarity. However,
the perception of trust and confidence in the main institutions appears highly dissimilar and
systematically greater in Emilia, as clearly shown in table 5. In particular behaviour towards
central and local government should be noted.
The criminality indicator also makes apparent profound differences between the two regions.
In Emilia all interviewees declare as negligible the influence of criminality on either their
firm’s activity or that of the territory, whilst in Campania 39% of firms interviewed maintain
that their own economic activity is prejudiced by criminal systems and an even higher
percentage maintain that the territory’s economy is jeopardised by such organisations.
This data brought out by the questionnaire survey is confirmed also by official statistics
regarding illicit and criminal activity and crime. In this case the comparison between
Campania and Emilia is synthesised in table 6. With respect to the three categories contained in
the table, Campania seems afflicted by social problems to a far greater extent than is observed
in either Emilia or Italy as a whole.
In conclusion, both official statistics and indicators emerging from the informative survey
make apparent substantial differences between the two regions. In particular the 4 categories of
indicator considered let one suppose a different composition and quality of social capital,
which could be useful in explaining the different organisation of the two regions and their
differences in terms of economic performance.
The different endowment of social capital gives northern and southern firms different chances
to succeed in the three strategies mentioned previously. The first strategy (building new
relationships  with retail organizations) demands high trust, in that collaborative vertical
relationships aimed at optimising logistic and information flows and seeking common
marketing goals, require loyalty and a cooperative outlook. It therefore mainly fits Emilian
district. The second strategy (innovation) also seems more viable for the Emilian district,
mostly because whatever the product innovation may be, its success will require strict retailer
collaboration (i.e. trust), for the launch and the subsequent promotional activities. Conversely,206   Social Capital and the Food System: Some Evidences from Empirical Research
the third strategy really seems tailored to the southern business style and the ability to build
and exploit a network-type social capital.
During the last three decades southern firms have acted as central nodes in the intra-industry
trade within the industry. They have traditionally imported considerable quantities of paste
from Greece and from non-EU sources, for re-processing and re-export. Recently, China has
become their first supplier. Imported Chinese tomato maybe exceeds formally registered flows,
with some manufacturers having been alleged to use Chinese raw product to can “bogus Italian
branded” tomatoes. In the future it is likely that major southern firms will focus on trading
activities more than on production, while small firms being forced to exit the market under the
pressure of lower cost foreign producers. With the core business shifting to trading expertise,
the sort of social capital made of networks allowing for the exploitation of business
opportunities and bargaining advantages associated with structural holes and hub positions, is
likely to become the main source of competitive advantage in the southern district.
Concluding remarks
Social capital can play a key role in current restructuring processes of the food system. Trust-
based social capital promotes collaborative agreements, reducing transaction costs and
allowing cooperative solutions in “prisoner dilemma type” games. Network-based social
capital gives central actors in the competitive arena more opportunities to exploit diverse
sources of competitive advantage. Empirical evidence from the processing tomato industry
suggest that different endowments of social capital can account for very different company
strategies and business styles. High levels of trust are leading emilian firms to improve quality
and seek cooperative agreement with large local retailers. Low level of trust and a traditional
attitude towards exploiting network forms of social capital (also through quasi-illegal
opportunistic behavior) are driving southern firms towards the new food system global
networking game, with unforeseeable competitive and welfare consequences. On theoretical
grounds the main suggestion of the paper is that network based social capital, along with trust,
greatly affect the food system and that a major effort is required in order to measure it.
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